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I From Tampa to Shenyang 
 It is emblematic of shrinking asylum opportunities in the industrial-
ized countries that Australia, once highly admired for its strong 
commitment to human rights, is now giving an extremely cold shoul-
der to a number of people in dire need of safe refuge. Vividly recalled 
is an incident where a Norwegian freighter, the Tampa, was refused 
entry to Australian territory after it had rescued hundreds of Afghan 
and other boat people from a sinking wooden ferry near Indonesia in 
the summer of 2001. Still shocking was a subsequent legislative 
initiative taken as a response to the incident to exclude certain 
islands and territories from the country's "migration zone" with a 
view to avoiding its international obligations to protect refugees. 
Simply put, certain parts of Australian territory were excised for the 
purpose of blocking asylum applications'. 
 Howard government's hard line policies on illegal immigrants and 
refugees also put in world-wide spotlight the plight of desperate
 Professor of International Law, Kanagawa University Faculty of Law, Yoko-
 hama, Japan. This paper was originally prepared for the international sympo-
 sium, "The Social Responsibility of Legal Profession in the Age of Globaliza-
 tion", commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Osaka City University Fac-
 ulty of Law, July 2003.
2 .:,,11[ 36 3 - 20041F(1101) 
young children, unaccompanied minors, pregnant women and the 
elderly, all confined under inhuman conditions  in outback refugee 
camps, the infamous Woomera detention center in particular. The 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the UN Human Rights 
Commission slammed Australia's mandatory and indefinite detention 
of asylum seekers after visiting five detention camps in June 20022. 
The Group's reasoned criticism, however, was adamantly rejected by 
the intransigent federal government, thus causing grave disappoint-
ment among refugee advocates3. 
  Human rights know no borders and there should be no ethical 
problem whatsoever in a Japanese citizen or academic criticizing 
Australian refugee policies. Frankly speaking, however, I feel a bit 
awkward in accusing a former human rights giant of its blunt failure 
to honor international legal standards ; As an academic based in 
Japan and concerned about human rights, I must confess that my own 
country's achievement in respect of refugees and asylum seekers, no 
better than the Australian record, is not really a source of pride. 
According to the UNHCR4 :
Of the major industrialized countries, Japan, which, has been a 
party to the 1951 UN Convention since 1981,has received by far 
the smallest number of asylum applications. The country's ethnic 
and cultural homogeneity has been sustained by strict controls on 
population movement and immigration, although over 10,000 
Indochinese refugees have been resettled or allowed to remain in 
Japan since 1975. In the 10 years from 1990 to 1999, only 1,100 
people applied for asylum in Japan. A strict time limit for 
making an application for asylum and an unusually high standard 
of proof meant that between 1990 and 1997, fewer than four per
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cent of these were recognized as refugees under the Convention. 
In 1998 and 1999, more asylum determinations were made than in 
the preceding decade, and the acceptance rate rose to over seven 
percent in 1999, while an increasing number of rejected asylum 
seekers were allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds.
 Japan acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol in 1981. Until the end of 2002, 2,725 
applications had been lodged, of which 305 were granted refugee 
status and 1,932 were rejected. During the ten-year period between 
1992 and 2001, merely 91 applications were granted. This figure is 
extremely small compared with that of any other major industrial-
ized country. Even Luxembourg and Malta, often categorized in 
international legal discourse as mini-states, outnumbered our country 
in recognized refugees with 156 and 422 respectively during the same 
period'. 
 It was in March 1993 that Japan's exceptionally strict refugee 
policy caught international attention. Amnesty International issued 
the report Japan : Inadequate Protection for Refugees and Asylum-
seekers alleging a number of ways in which the country failed to fully 
abide by its obligations toward refugees and asylum seekers6. A 
follow-up report was published in January the following year high-
lighting continuing inadequacies in Japanese policies toward them7. 
Each time the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, a 
responsible state organ for determining refugee status, made a sub-
mission staunchly refuting Amnesty's observations'. 
  Amnesty's interventions helped unveil the country's otherwise 
secretive refugee determination procedures. Encouraged, academics, 
practicing lawyers and NGOs voiced concerns about the treatment of
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asylum seekers in Japan with the hope of inducing institutional 
 reform, only to no avail, though9. Human rights treaty bodies for 
their part, in examining Japanese periodic reports, urged that refu-
gees and asylum seekers be guaranteed due treatment in conformity 
with international obligations' 
  Toward the end of 1990's, an increasing number of asylum applica-
tions were lodged by Burmese, Kurds and Afghans . Responding to 
this newly emerging phenomenon, a National Association of Lawyers 
to Defend Refugees was established in 1997, enabling otherwise 
powerless asylum seekers to be effectively represented in the admin-
istrative determination procedure as well as in the process of judicial 
review. As mentioned below, industrious endeavours of lawyers in 
due course brought forth epoch-making judicial decisions in favour of 
asylum seekers. In 1999, Japan Association of Refugees was launched 
by concerned citizens and started providing an impressive array of 
assistance to those in need of protection. The Association has been 
working on programs to raise awareness among local citizens of the 
unspeakable plight of refugees in Japan as well". 
 It is ironic that a long-awaited political process for institutional 
reform was eventually ignited by an incident which took place 
abroad : The Shenyang incident is a case in point. Five North 
Koreans entered the Japanese General Consulate compound in 
Shenyang in China on May 8, 2002, seeking refuge and passage to a 
third country. Three of them, two adult women and a two-year little 
girl. were seized by Chinese armed police and dragged from the 
premises. Two adult men reached the visa application section of the 
consulate but forcibly removed from there by Chinese police. A 
shocking video footage was widely aired on national TV showing a 
vice consulate quietly picking up debris on the spot and handing it
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over to the police while desperate North Korean women were being 
dragged kicking and screaming out of the compound. Obviously, 
consulate staff were not concerned about a possible violation of 
relevant articles of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions. However, as Brad Glosserman pointed out12 :
The real scandal is the policy that Tokyo has pursed in handling 
refugees. Last year 353 individuals sought asylum in Japan and 
less than two dozen were given it. Reportedly, hours before the 
intrusion in Shengan the Japanese ambassador in Beijing told his 
staff that any North Koreans who turned up seeking asylum 
were to be turned away to avoid "difficulties." This long-
standing policy is an embarrassment. It mocks Japan's declared 
intention to aid the disadvantaged and undermines its claim to 
play a leading role in the region. A willingness to help the poor 
only when they keep their distance is just another form of 
xenophobia.
 In terms of international law, the Shenyang incident was relevant 
to diplomatic asylum, a legally controversial institution which none-
theless has been often invoked worldwide to give refuge at least 
temporarily to those who need protection13. Strangely, what started 
out as an incident of diplomatic asylum turned out to be an exemplar 
symbolizing Japan's poor record of territorial asylum extended to 
those who make it to Japan". The summer of 2002 saw an array of 
proposals put forward by political parties including the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party aimed at reforming the Japanese refugee protec-
tion system. Most noteworthy was the establishment in June of the 
Special Working Group on Refugee Problems in an advisory panel on
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Japanese immigration policies to the Justice Minister. The Working 
Group, composed of 8 individuals, compiled a progressive report in 
November with a number of proposals in an attempt to revise the 
current legal framework to deal with asylum applications". In 
March, 2003, a government prepared bill was submitted to the Diet to 
amend part of the immigration rules regulating the treatment of 
asylum seekers", the first legislative attempt ever made to handle 
refugee issues in the last 20 years. 
  Below this paper explores the development of Japanese laws and 
judicial decisions concerning refugees in an attempt to show how far 
we have come and where we are headed for in terms of asylum 
policies. In so doing, it will be of some use to put refugee problems 
into global perspective first and find out how the global development 
on refugee law has affected, if any, contemporary Japanese practices.
II Global Development : A Paradigm Shift 
 The current international system, based on the principle of equality 
of sovereign states, require that individuals belong to a state to 
ensure their protection and to ascertain state responsibilities for 
particular individuals. Refugees are a problem in this system precise-
ly because they have broken bonds with their state of origin and are 
left stateless either de jure or de fact. This understanding is reflected 
in the legal concept of refugee formulated in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. The Convention was drafted to deal with a large number 
of refugees remaining in European soil in the Post-WW II period. It 
also was heavily informed by the political interests of the West in the 
prevailing cold war realities. It defines a refugee in Article 1 A(2) as 
a person who :
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as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing 
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or , owing to such fear, is unwill-
ing to return to it.
 As analyzed by one influential writer, "the normal mutual bond of 
trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance between an individual and 
the government of his home country has been broken (or simply does 
not exist) in their case"", which makes a refugee. It is a logical 
consequence therefore that a solution to the problem is to re-establish 
social bonds with a country either of origin or elsewhere. It has been 
widely known that there are three durable solutions to the refugee 
problem : voluntary repatriation to their countries of origin, settle-
ment in the country of refuge and resettlement in a third country, all 
to re-establish social bonds. 
 For geopolitical reasons in the cold war context, voluntary return 
to the country of origin was nearly inconceivable : external settle-
ment or in the words of Gervase Coles "exilic bias"" was considered 
most durable. On the other hand, refugees were not guaranteed 
admission to re-establish membership elsewhere as her own right. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Refugee Conven-
tion, and the 1967 UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum deliberately 
avoided providing for a duty on states to grant asylum to refugees. A 
UN Conference on Territorial Asylum in 197719 found itself unsuc-
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cessful in setting forth an individual right to asylum. All that was 
imposed on states is the principle of non-refoulement, a duty not to 
return a refugee to a country where there would be a risk of persecu-
tion. 
  Another feature of international refugee law is that it does not 
mandate any particular procedure for determining refuge status : 
Neither does it create an international mechanism in charge of status 
determination. Thus the determination of refugeehood is left entirely 
to state authorities. Article 35 of the Refugee Convention regulating 
a role of UNHCR to supervise the implementation of the Convention 
is simply emasculated20. The Conclusions issued by the Executive 
Committee of the UNHCR Programme are given surprisingly low 
profile lest they should shake the foundation of states' complete 
control over immigration. 
  Since 1980's and particularly 1990's, the exilic bias has broken 
down. International discourse was now filled with new arguments 
supporting liberal/human rights approaches. Legal theories emphas-
izing the right to return emerged while the exilic bias was criticized 
for unduly relieving refugee producing countries of their international 
responsibility. A new legal concept, the right to remain, was coined 
by UNHCR while tackling the root causes of mass flight was 
repeatedly called for. From this new perspective, the most durable 
solution is no more external settlement : it is either repatriation or 
prevention of flight21. 
 Liberal/human rights approaches seem to fundamentally refor-
mulate refugee law. Traditionally refugees were outside their coun-
tries of origin and the solution to refugee problems was almost 
always external settlement. Only those who could not meet the 
standard of refugeehood were returned home. Responsibility of refu-
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gee producing countries was left untouched. In other words, refugee 
law simply stopped at the border of the home country. These formu-
lae are now substantially challenged. An argument casts doubt on the 
concept of refugee which is inherently connected with alienage, 
"outside the country of origin" . The argument goes that from a 
human rights perspective the internally displaced persons are as 
worthy of international protection as refugees22. The implication is 
that managing the internally displaced is the best solution to refugee 
problems for it prevents the outflow of refugees and helps them 
exercise the right to remain in their countries of origin23. 
  The focus of international discourse is now increasingly shifted to 
source countries, and seemingly refugee protection is coalescing into 
a human rights paradigm which does not stop at the national border. 
Creation of safety zones, resort to humanitarian intervention and 
interdiction at the sea are a logical extension of the new formula. 
Clearly, this new trend was spurred by the end of cold war. The 
political and ideological value attached to refugees has evaporated. A 
sharp rise in the number of asylum seekers from the East as well as 
the South put the Western governments on their guard. Thus came 
narrow constructions of the definition of refugee, detention of asylum 
seekers, new visa control, sanctions on carriers and what have you. 
As Alexander Aleinikoff analyzes" :
[W] e may well be witnessing the troubling use of a humanitarian 
discourse to mask a reaffirmation of state-centeredness. That is, 
the emphasis on repatriation and root causes will help developed 
states justify the new strategies adopted to "solve" their asylum 
"crises".... [T] he story of change is not about the melding of 
refugee law into human rights law ; rather, it is the exchange of
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    an exilic bias for policies of containment- detention of asylum 
    seekers, visa requirements, closing opportunities for resettle-
    ment, push-backs, and return. These politics are grounded less in 
   a desire to breach the walls of state sovereignty than in an 
   attempt to keep third world refugee problems from inconvenienc-
   ing the developed states. The significant risk here is that a 
   politics of containment will have the ugly result of abandoning
   refugees to the very states from which they fled in search of 
   assistance and protection. If this is so, then refugee advocates 
   who see recent repatriation efforts as vehicles for doing human 
   rights work within the sending countries may be unwitting allies 
   in reinforcing the state-centered paradigm they seek to over-
    throw.
 This analysis was presented in a book published in 1995. What 
transpired in the following years, the Tampa incident in particular, 
evidently testifies the validity of his discerning observation. The 
exilic bias is now replaced by another bias, the source country bias. 
What we witnessed in the 1990's may be properly expressed as a shift 
in refugee policy "from asylum to containment"". Undoubtedly, this 
shift was reflective of state-centered concerns of ruling elites of the 
industrialized countries. 
 The decreasing number of refugees in the industrialized North may 
be seen as a victory of the containment policy by those who advocate 
it, but it in fact has led to more asylum-seekers resorting to any 
means necessary, regular or irregular, safe or danger, to access soils 
of the advanced countries. As Jenna Shearer Demir points out, " [t] he 
nationalities of those most often smuggled or trafficked into the 
European Union closely corresponds to the nationalities most often
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given asylum worldwide, with most asylum seekers either smuggled 
or trafficked into the European Union"26. Obviously, these human 
tragedies are a structural outcome of the source country bias.
ill Refugee Protection in Japan 
1 A Brief Historical Portrayal 
 Since the nineteenth century, there have been quite a few cases in 
which Japan provided asylum in its territory to those who fled from 
persecution'. However, the admission of asylum seekers was deter-
mined only on a political basis, and the legislation on the treatment 
of asylum seekers was not established. In courts, people who sought 
asylum from persecution had no choice but to resort to the jurispru-
dence of the necessity or principle of the non-extradition of political 
criminals. 
 Since the occurrence of Yoong Sun-Gil case in 1960's that attracted 
immense public attentions, the interest in refugee issues has been 
raised among civic and academic circles, and there were even occa-
sions where a "Bill of the Protection of Political Asylum-Seekers" 
was introduced to the House of Representatives in the form of the 
Petition or Diet Members' Bill. Such attempts, however, were not 
successful. In the Bill on the Immigration Control Law introduced by 
the government several times, the provisions of the entry and status 
of refugees were not included. In the late 1960's, the extradition of 
young Taiwanese activists for independence was carried out in spite 
of the risk of their lives and physical safety. It unveiled the govern-
ment's negative attitudes towards the admission of asylum-seekers. 
 Despite the fact that the Refugee Convention had been adopted in 
1951, the Japanese Government, considering it to be solely targeting
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the specific situation in Europe, did not take any steps to ratify or 
accede to it. Since the adoption of the Protocol on the Status of 
Refugees in 1967 that aimed at abolishing time and geographical 
limitations in the Convention, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Prime Minister's Office became interested in and began to investigate 
the treatment of refugees in foreign countries, and yet, the accession 
to the Convention and the Protocol was not realized. The restrictive 
attitudes of the government towards asylum-seekers and refugees 
have arisen both from the government's fundamental immigration 
control policy which restricts the settlement and residence of for-
eigners, and the geopolitical and diplomatic circumstances under 
which Japan neighbours politically unstable countries. It is undeni-
able that the society which has placed paramount value on economic 
development functioned as one of the obstructing the establishment 
of refugee protection legislation. 
  In Japan refugee issues were considered as those of assistance to 
people who was seeking relief in refugee camps in foreign countries 
and the treatment of asylum-seekers who arrived in Japan and the 
admission of refugees in its territory were not considered refugee 
issues as such. Vietnamese boat people who had arrived in Japan 
since 1975 were treated like illegal immigrants or stowaways and 
they were not given permission for landing unless they had a guaran-
tee of living expenses from UNHCR and a guarantee of an admission 
from a foreign country. Moreover, a permitted period for landing was 
strictly limited and the resettlement in a third country was strongly 
advised by the authorities. 
 The Japanese attitudes of refusing the admission of boat people 
soon faced acute criticisms from the Western countries, particularly 
from the United States. Owing to such foreign pressure, the Japanese
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government determined to allow settlement of Vietnam refugees 
through the Cabinet Understanding. The scope of admission was 
expanded to include Indo-Chinese refugee in general, as a quota of 
admission was gradually increased. In the meantime, due to the delay 
in responding to the issue of boat people, the fragility of Japanese 
refugee policy was brought to light both at home and abroad, and 
among other things, non-accession to the Refugee Convention and the 
Protocol became highlighted. In order for the government to show a 
positive attitude towards refugee issues, the accession to the Conven-
tion was considered to be the most effective, and the government 
ministries concerned began to explore the possibility of accession. As 
a consequence, the Refugee Convention and the Protocol were finally 
acceded to in 1981. With the accession to the Convention, the Immi-
gration Control Order was amended into the "Immigration Control 
and Refugee Recognition Act (Immigration Control Act)". The Con-
vention, the Protocol and the Immigration Act came into force on 1 
January 1992. 
 The Immigration Control Act was proposed and adopted for the 
purpose of "establishing refugee recognition procedures in order to 
implement" the Refugee Convention and the Protocol. The Refugee 
Convention has no provision on refugee recognition procedures. Yet 
it is indispensable to identify the beneficiaries of protection when the 
Convention is implemented. The Western countries which have 
signed the Convention, virtually without exception, have established 
refugee recognition procedures, and provided protection under the 
Refugee Convention to those who were recognized as refugees. 
Domestic measures taken by the Japanese government is basically in 
line with such practice. Accordingly, the refugee recognition proce-
dures were introduced for the first time in Japan.
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  As mentioned above, the direct cause of an introduction of refugee 
recognition procedures was the emergence of Indo-Chinese refugee 
problems. Nevertheless, Indo-Chinese refugees continued to be admit-
ted in practice at the policy level, on the Cabinet Understandings. In 
other words, Indo-Chinese refugees brought the refugee recognition 
procedures to Japan, yet, except a small number of cases handled in 
earlier years, they never went through the procedures for themselves. 
Indo-Chinese refugees were admitted for settlement according to a 
special quota and the Refugee Convention was only invoked corre-
spondingly to them. 
  The Japanese government, at the time of accession to the Refugee 
Convention, presented a primary reason for the accession as "promot-
ing Japanese international cooperation in refugee issues"28. Although 
the meaning of "international cooperation" here was not clear, Japan 
made it clear that it would follow the practice of the Western 
countries in the field of refugees. Even so Japan did not intend to 
apply the Convention solely to those who fled from the Communist 
countries. The political nature of the Convention did not alter the 
particular geopolitical and diplomatic circumstances in which Japan 
existed. Among other things, the fundamental policy that strictly 
controls the entry of foreigners was maintained. While the govern-
ment declared itself a member of the Western Block by participating 
in the Convention, it kept vigilant in granting asylum, taking into 
account Japan's particular circumstances. The Ministry of Justice 
stated, right before the accession to the Convention, "we do not have 
an intention to immediately open the door for asylum"".
2 Refugee Determination in Law and Practice 
 Application for refugee status is effected by an asylum application
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filed with a local immigration bureau. In earlier years, local immigra-
tion officers tended to show an excessively negative reaction due to 
their inexperience and lack of training and on some occasions even 
refused to accept asylum applications, which fortunately is no more 
a case. An asylum applicant, upon submitting an application, is called 
to report in person to a local immigration bureau (now mainly the 
Tokyo or Osaka Regional Immigration bureau) and have an inter-
view directly with a refugee inquirer, an officer newly appointed 
under the Immigration Control Act. 
 Refugee inquirer is required to summarize the results of the inter-
view in the form of the written statement. Following the examination 
by the inquirer, the local immigration bureau forms its views and 
forwards it to the Refugee Recognition Section in the Immigration 
Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. Then the Director of the Bureau, 
taking into consideration the views and the report prepared by a local 
bureau, makes a refugee status determination in the name of the 
Minister of Justice. Apparently, UNHCR is entitled to be informed of 
all the asylum applications registered and is allowed to freely express 
its own views on those applications. Yet it is unclear how much 
influence UNHCR's views have on the actual decision-making of 
refugee recognition. In practice there are cases in which a person 
recognized as refugee by the UNHCR has been refused refugee status 
by the Ministry of Justice30. 
 An asylum seeker who has received a negative decision is eligible 
to appeal to the Ministry of Justice within seven days of the date he/ 
she receives the notice of such decision. The appeal follows exactly 
the same path as the initial application except that the views and the 
report of a local bureau are forwarded to the Adjudication Division 
of the Immigration Bureau, not the Refugee Recognition Section. The
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decision on the appeal is made by the Director of the Bureau in the 
name of the Minister of Justice. As indicated, until the end of 2002, 
305 applicants were granted refugee status out of 2782 applications. 
Included in the successful figure are seven appeal cases. 
  The negative decision at the first instance is handedout with the 
reasons, which in the past were so simple as to merely mention that 
the application does not meet the criteria for refugee status articulat-
ed in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention. Such reasoning was 
criticized as being no more than giving no reason for non-recognition 
decision. As a result, the contents of reasons for non-recognition 
decision were to be slightly improved. In general, the existence of 
sufficient evidence is emphasized in the refugee status determination. 
 One of the reasons for non-recognition that has attracted particular 
interests in recent years is so called "60-day rule". According to 
Article 61,2-2 of the Immigration Control Act, application for refugee 
status is required to be filed within 60 days of the date of applicant' 
s landing in Japan. If circumstances that make the applicant a 
refugee arise while he/she is staying in Japan, the period starts from 
the date when he/she becomes aware of the occurrence of such facts. 
Those who could not make application within 60 days for unavoid-
able reasons, however, may apply, as an exception to the rule, even 
after the period has passed. It is submitted that the time limitation 
rule was introduced not only because it was necessary to conduct 
prompt refugee recognition, but also because it was considered that 
"the fact that the applicant did not apply for refugee status promptly 
by itself revealed inappropriateness for refugee status". Taking into 
account geographical circumstances in Japan, 60 days were consid-
ered to be adequate for the asylum applicant to visit one of the local 
immigration bureaus31
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 The problem is that the 60-day rule has been applied formally and 
negative decision at the first instance were made without initiating 
the examination of the merits of the application in the handling of 
asylum applications. The Immigration Control Act provides an 
exception to the "60-day rule" in the name of "unavoidable circum-
stances". However, the circumstances recognized as unavoidable 
tend to be interpreted quite restrictively, only including such circum-
stances as illness and the disruption of traffic. Thus, blocked by the 
time limitation, not a few asylum seekers who are otherwise entitled 
to refugee status have been denied such status. Refugee recognition 
procedures are in essence aimed at assessing whether or not an 
asylum applicant is a refugee. Rejecting an asylum solely because the 
application was made outside the 60-day timeframe generates trange 
results in which a refugee cannot be recognized as a refugee. The 
actual implementation of "60-day rule" displays to a great degree the 
Japanese government's attitudes towards refugee recognition. 
 The problem is amplified by the poor quality of Refugee Inquirers. 
Although the post of Refugee Inquire is professional in character, in 
practice an immigration officer is appointed as Refugee Inquirer in 
two to three-year term. Without receiving any substantial training 
beforehand, Refugee Inquirer so appointed tends to do the work as 
he/she does the work for regular immigration control. It is inevitably 
likely that it will negatively affect proper implementation of refugee 
recognition work, including the way of conducting interviews. Under 
the circumstances, the consciousness on the part of Refugee Inquirer 
of doing the regular immigration work severely influences the admin-
istration of refugee recognition. 
  In the refugee recognition procedures in Japan, the process through 
which to reach a decision on refugee recognition lacks transparency.
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The appeal process has fundamental flaws in that it is a mere 
repetition of the initial examination. Moreover, the legal status of 
asylum applicants is quite unstable until the determination on refugee 
status is made. The Immigration Control Act dons not offer such 
resident status as "refugee" or "asylum-seeker". The issue of refugee 
recognition is regarded as a separate issue from that of allowing 
resident status. Due to the lack of proper resident status, the access 
to various social services including medical treatments become diffi-
cult to obtain. As a consequence, ensuring the minimum standard of 
living also becomes difficult for asylum seekers. 
 A person who has been denied refugee status by the Justice 
Minister is entitled to bring a legal claim, demanding the repeal of the 
negative decision. For a long period of time, however, lawsuits had 
been by no means an effective remedy for asylum-seekers largely due 
to the lack of understanding of the nature of refugee recognition on 
the side of the judiciary. It was only in 1997 that the repeal of 
non-recognition decision was for the first time granted. From the 
cases decide, following problems have been identified. 
 First, excessive reliance on objective evidence. The courts have put 
forward a basic principle that, for a person to be recognized as a 
refugee, "in addition to the existence of subjective circumstances 
under which a person has a fear of persecution, objective circum-
stances need to exist, in which an ordinary person must have a fear 
of persecution if he/she were in the same position"32. The courts have 
placed a great emphasis on "objective circumstances" and rigorously 
required the submission of evidence which prove the existence of 
those objective circumstances. Such rigid stance on the existence of 
objective evidence does not contribute to proper judgment on refugee 
status. It should be reminded that asylum seekers are often in a
(1084) Protecting  Whom?  : Japanese Refugee Policies Revisited 19 
disadvantageous position in terms of collecting evidence. Objective 
evidence should be considered to be the material for reference, but as 
is internationally agreed, the refugee status is to be determined by the 
judgment on the credibility of the applicant's statements. 
  Second, there is an issue of burden of proof. The courts clearly 
stated that "the burden of proof for establishing that an asylum 
applicant had met criteria for refugee status was placed upon the 
same asylum applicant him/herself"33. However, the rules on the 
burden of proof in ordinary criminal or civil cases cannot be directly 
applied to the refugee status determination. Since refugee status 
determination is the application of criteria to the facts under the 
circumstances in which the verification of the facts is extremely 
difficult, it is not relevant to place the burden of proof solely on the 
asylum applicant. 
  Third, there is an issue touching the essence of the refugee recogni-
tion. One court once categorically stated : "When the country's 
political situation is quite unstable, the objective assessment of 
whether or not events which verify the applicant's refugee status 
have occurred is extremely difficult and requires a highly political 
judgment"34. The recognition of refugee status is here characterized 
as the one which requires a highly political judgment. This is a grave 
mistake. It is true that refugee recognition is a difficult task. How-
ever, it should be an application of criteria to the facts and, juridically 
speaking, it does never require a highly political judgment. If the 
refugee recognition were characterized as a political act, the room 
for judicial review would be considerably narrowed. 
  Fourth, there is an issue of interpretation. It may be worth mention-
ing here some representative examples which reveal insufficient 
understanding. First, such a statement in the court's ruling as "escape
20 **) E IaM 36  AM 3 5- 2004 (1083)
from the army or illegal departure from the country should be duly 
punished, but such punishment is not related to refugee status"' 
emanates from a quite inaccurate understanding of persecution. It is 
fully legitimate go grant refugee status based upon the very risk of 
being punished on the escape from the army or the illegal departure 
from the country. 
  The courts also ruled that "since the applicant's motivation for 
illegal entry into Japan was considered as earning money by working 
as a migrant worker, it can never be assessed that the applicant fled 
the country of his nationality, China, due to his fear of persecution"". 
However, there may be a case where a refugee's immediate purpose 
of departure from his/her country of origin was to earn money. 
Furthermore, the courts' understanding revealed in an expression like 
"since persecution in the Refugee Convention is interpreted to mean 
the matters relating the acts committed by the sate authorities, the 
court cannot conclude that there has been a persecution even though 
the applicant has a fear of being attacked by a religious opposition 
group"37also discloses the courts' inadequate understanding of the 
agent of persecution. Japanese courts have rarely if ever shown 
interest in Conclusions of UNHCR Executive Committee and 
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status38.
3 Dynamics of Judicial Review39 
 As mentioned above, an increasing number of lawyers started 
jumping into the refugee field toward the end of 1990's and grouped 
themselves into an association for the protection of asylum seekers. 
Two of the largest groups of asylum seekers, Burmese and Kurdish, 
received particular attentions and a number of litigations were filed
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challenging the legality of non-recognition of their refugee status. 
Ironically, it was after 9/11, however, that refugee advocates felt the 
advent of a new era of judicial activism. The immigration authorities 
confined Afghan asylum seekers, mostly Hazaras, immediately after 
the WTC attack for alleged violations of the Immigration Control 
Act. Refugee advocates were put heavily on the alert. Asylum seekers 
had been seldom detained ; If any, it had been only after the initial 
negative decision was made. Afghan asylum seekers were confined 
pending their initial applications and even the interviews by Refugee 
Inquirers had yet to come. The confinement was unprecedented. 
  Nine Afghan asylum seekers undertook an action to the Tokyo 
District Court demanding revocation of the disposition of issuance of 
the confinement order and the suspension of its execution. On 
November 6 2001, the court issued a decision accommodating the 
request of five of them for the suspension of execution of the confine-
ment order. Presiding Judge Masayuki Fujiyama said the immigra-
tion authorities need not detain the Afghans because they had 
accepted being questioned before they were confined. In correctly 
acknowledging the domestic applicability of the Refugee Convention 
which enjoys legal status superior to statutes in Japanese law, 
Fujiyama opined that "one cannot but conclude that the issuance of 
confinement order and the subsequent confinement of a person who 
may be qualified as a refugee simply because there are reasons to 
suspect illegal entry or illegal residence are in contravention of 
Article 31(2) of the Refugee Convention." Demonstrating outstanding 
sensitivity to international legal discourse, he stated that traveling 
through third countries in a series of movements with a view to 
fleeing from the territory where his life or freedom is threatened still 
qualifies him as a refugee "directly coming" in the sense of the same
22  ,,)Ili 36 AM 3 2004V (1081)
provision". 
  Just one day prior to the epoch-making decision, another bench of 
the Tokyo District Court had reached quite the opposite decision in 
respect of the rest of the Afghan asylum seekers. The circumstances 
of the case were almost analogous to those of the above mentioned 
case, but Presiding Judge Yosuke Ichimura trod a different reasoning 
path : "Considering that the confinement ensures the smooth and 
prompt progress of oral inquiry and examination procedures regard-
ing the foreign national liable to be deported and considering also 
that the fact that he may be qualified as a refugee does not perfuncto-
rily make unlawful a disposition with a view of his eventual deporta-
tion, even if he in fact should be a refugee as defined by the Refugee 
Convention, the confinement as prescribed by the Immigration Con-
trol Act would hardly be a restriction of movement `other than those 
which are necessary,' and therefore the issuance of the confinement 
order in this case does not violate Article 31(2)of the Refugee Conven-
tion"". 
 Ichimura's decision substantially negates the validity of the Refu-
gee Convention. Inadvertently subsuming international law into 
otherwise inferior domestic statutes, the finding represents a funda-
mental misunderstanding of Japanese Constitutional order. It was 
truly unfortunate that the Tokyo High Court repealed Fujiyama's 
decision on December 18, thus giving appellate imprimatur to the 
arguments propounded by the Ichimura's bench". 
 The Afghan asylum seekers were confined in execution of the 
confinement order. After the determination denying refugee status 
was made (on November 26), a deportation order was issued against 
them (on December 27), and they were transferred from the Tokyo 
Regional Immigration Bureau Confinement Facility to the East
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Japan Immigration Center to give effect to the deportation order. 
They filed yet another litigation, demanding suspension of the depor-
tation order. To the surprise of many legal observers, their request 
was granted on March 1 2002 once again by Judge Fujiyama of the 
Tokyo District Court. His incise reasoning is undoubtedly up to 
international standards43:
At the moment of his entry into Japan, he feared the risk of 
persecution by reason of his ethnicity and religion in his home 
country, Afghanistan, and his fear was well-grounded enough to 
qualify him as a refugee as defined by Article 31 of the Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
 It is not impossible to construe that, even if the designation of 
Afghanistan as the destination of his deportation should be a 
violation of the principle of non-refoulement, such violation 
would necessitate only the revocation of the designation of the 
destination of deportation, but not that of the confinement, and 
the question of the legality of the confinement would call for 
other considerations. 
 However, Article 31(2) of the Convention, which provides that 
the contracting States shall not apply to the movement of those 
refugees who meet the conditions provided in paragraph 1 of the 
same article, restrictions of movement other than those which 
are necessary, prohibits in principle such restrictions even when 
those refugees could have entered the country illegally and were 
residing illegally. This is because for most refugees it is deifficult 
to lawfully enter the country. Therefore, it must be construed as 
being in violation of Article 31(2) of the Convention to issue a 
deportation order against a person likely to be qualified as a
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refugee and place him in confinement only on the grounds that 
there are reasons to suspect illegal entry and illegal residence".
 As predicted, however, the Tokyo High Court annulled part of 
Fujiyama's decision on the grounds that there was no immediate 
necessity to suspend the execution of confinement45. Fujiyama for his 
part was adamant in holding up the noble spirits of international 
documents. Thus another welcoming decision came from his bench,46 
this time rescinding a decision of the Minister of Justice which 
refused refugee status to an Ethiopian man on the grounds that his 
application had been submitted overdue, namely after the prescribed 
time limit of 60 days had passed. Fujiyama for the first time in 
history of judicial judgments called for the liberal application of the 
exception to the 60-day rule and sensibly stated that a decision not to 
apply for asylum while residing peacefully should be categorically 
qualified as an unavoidable circumstance, an exception to the 60-day 
rule. Exceptions were allowed by the immigration authorities only 
for illness and the traffic disruption. He chided the immigration 
authorities for such restrictive application of the exception, saying 
that such a view does not fit the purpose of the Refugee Convention 
as it leads to many cases in which the government rejects refugee 
status for applicants. In so deciding, Fujiyama pointed out that no 
other developed country sets such a deadline for asylum applications, 
a comparative law analysis rarely seen in Japanese jurisprudence. 
The decision was upheld by the Tokyo High Court on February 18, 
2003. 
 Interestingly, Judge Ichimura of the Tokyo District Court whose 
view had been in a marked contrast to that of Fujimayma in regard 
to the legality of confinement of Afghan asylum seekers granted a
(1078) Protecting  Whom?  : Japanese Refugee Policies Revisited 25 
request by a Turkish Kurd and rescinded an administrative decision 
which denied him refugee status ". Examining in detail the legal, 
political and human rights situations surrounding Kurds in Turkey, 
and affirming credibility of his testimony, Ichimura dived into 
recognizing him as a refugee. Ichimura found that he would be 
subjected to torture in the prosecution proceedings without due 
process and that an anticipated punishment would be dispropor-
tionately severe. The judge correctly emphasized that it is not the 
quality or the degree of political activities but fear of being persecut-
ed for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion that is the very basis for refugee 
status. This encouraging decision, however, was overturned by the 
Tokyo High Court on May 22, 2003. The appellate court cast doubt 
on his fear of being persecuted if returned after finding that the man 
had not faced persecution before entering Japan. 
 A watershed ruling was rendered by the Osaka District Court on 
March 27, 2003, in which for the first time an Afghan national was 
awarded refugee status in a suit against the government" . A man of 
the Hazara minority fought Taliban forces in 1994 as a soldier for the 
Hazara-dominated Islamic Unity Party. He later left the party and 
fled to Pakistan. He entered Japan in 1998 and applied for asylum 
after learning that the Taliban expanded its influence in Afghanistan 
and fearing that he would face persecution if returned. Thoroughly 
looking into the circumstances and correctly giving benefit of the 
doubt to the asylum seeker, Presiding judge Ikuo Yamashita affirmed 
his refugee status, thus revoking the Justice Mnister's earlier nega-
tive decision. 
 In a case where an Afghan asylum seeker was arrested and 
prosecuted for illegal entry and presence, the Hiroshima District
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Court exempted him of a penalty based on a thoughtful understand-
ing of Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention as embodied in Article 
70-2 of the Immigration Control Act". Presiding judge Hidenobu 
Konishi recognized him to be a refugee after examining the relevant 
circumstances and finding his (apparently inconsistent) testimony 
credible. Correctly, the applicant's motivation to gain employment 
per se was not considered a factor against refugee status. Particular-
ly noteworthy was the fact that Konishi took into full consideration 
the UN HCR's Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Stan-
dars relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers of 1999 in interpret-
ing Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention. The court stated : "The 
expression 'coming directly' covers the situation of a person who, 
entering Japan directly from the country of origin, or from another 
country where his protection, safety and security could not be 
assured, transits an intermediate country for a short period of time 
without having applied for, or received, asylum there.", a phrase 
entirely copied from the Guideline. 
 The applicant let five months pass by before presenting himself to 
the authorities. Konishi carefully considered the feelings and special 
situations of a refugee and judged that the requirement of "without 
delay" in Article 72-2 of the Immigration Control Act had been met 
in the present case. The judgment was appealed by the prosecutor to 
the Hiroshima High Court, which in turn sentenced the man to a fine 
of Y300,000 for illegal entry and presence5". Apparently the appellate 
court overturned the lower court decision. In fact, it substantively 
upheld Konishi's thoughtful finding. The only difference lied in the 
interpretation of "without delay". The appellate court found that 
under the particular circumstances a reasonable period of time had 
already passed, which would have guaranteed immunity from penal-
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ization under the rubric of "without delay". 
 The single most dramatic judgment was rendered by the Tokyo 
District Court on April 9, 2003". Again it derived from the Fujiyama's 
bench. The court ordered the government to pay Y9.5 million in 
damages to a Myanmar man for suffering he had to endure after 
denied refugee status. It ruled the initial non-recognition determina-
tion was in error. Fujiyama stated that the government failed to 
examine his case thoroughly and made an incorrect decision in 1998. 
 The man filed a lawsuit seeking reversal of the initial negative 
decision. Unprecidented, shortly before the suit was to be concluded 
in March 2002, the Justice Minister retracted her earlier decision and 
granted him refugee status, saying that the facts of his case became 
known during the legal process. The man switched his lawsuit to one 
demanding redress for his suffering. Fujiyama emphasized the gov-
ernment's duty to conduct a careful investigation into asylum applica-
tions. The court recognized the man's physical and psychological 
damages suffered while in detention for nine months from June 1998 
and during the period until March 2002 when he was granted refugee 
status and ordered the government to pay the amount of money 
almost equivalent to that requested by the plaintiff. 
 It is particularly worth noting that the judgment clearly declared 
that the burden of proof rests with both the refugee and the govern-
ment, the first judicial pronouncement o that effect helping, at least 
partly, bring Japanese secluded refugee recognition practice into line 
with international standards. After admitting the initial duty to 
present materials relevant to refugee status lies on the asylum 
applicant, Fujiyama stated : "The Justice Minister has an obligation 
to make a refugee determination after, giving due consideration to 
the situations of the refugee applicant, she assesses and examines
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fairly and carefully the applicant's testimony as well as the materials 
submitted, and conducts a supplementary investigation as necessary. 
One should say that this obligation is owed to the refugee applicant 
as well who has a right to submit such application.” 
  One most recent judgment dealt another blow to the government 
strict refugee policy. The Fujimaya's bench rescinded a decision 
which, based on the "60-day rule", had denied refugee status to a 
Kurdish asylum seeker (on May 16, 2003). Fujimaya stated that the 
negative decision was unfounded.
IV The Way Forward 
 A series of judicial pronouncements described above, never expect-
ed only a few years ago, signals a strong message from the judiciary 
calling for the revamping of the outmoded refugee recognition proce-
dures in Japan. Triggered by the Shenyang incident in May 2002, a 
working group was established in June 2002 in a private advisory 
panel on immigration policies of the Justice Minister to review the 
current refugee protection system. The mandate entrusted to the 
working group, however, was quite limited ; It was requested only to 
examine : (i) validity of the 60-day rule,(ii) legal treatment of asylum 
seekers whose refugee applications are pending, and (iii) the mecha-
nism of appeal. 
 A progressive report of the working group was submitted to the 
advisory panel on immigration policies in October52. It proposed that 
the deadline should be extended to 6-12 months and that asylum 
seekers should be legally protected against deportation while their 
applications are pending. It also proposed that the government secure 
conditions in which asylum seekers may concentrate on their applica-
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tion processes. The third issue on the appeal system was deferred to 
the final report that should come in due course. 
 The panel, after examining the report, added two warnings against 
possible abuse of the system by illegal residents or workers and even 
terrorists. The panel insisted as well that the legal guarantee against 
deportation and the provision of social services to asylum seekers 
should be extended only to genuine refugees and that such measure 
should be taken under conditions which do not allow asylum seekers 
to work. It seems that the primary concern of the panel is to keep 
refugees off from the national border in line with the containment 
policy widely administered by the industrialized countries. That the 
report starts with expressing suspicions about asylum seekers indi-
cates that refugees are basically not welcome not only in the West 
but also here in Japan. 
 In March 2003, the Ministry of Justice submitted a bill to the Diet 
in an attempt to revise part of the Immigration Control Act". Among 
other things, it introduced a new system for the refugee recognition 
procedures after, at least partly, the proposals made by the panel. A 
welcoming revision is the abolition of the notorious 60-day time 
limitation. Another conspicuous feature of the bill is that it provides 
for the granting of temporary residence permit to asylum applicants. 
Currently a number of applicants lack permit allowing them to stay 
in Japan and face the possibility of deportation at any time. 
 The problem is that temporary residence permit would not be 
granted to those who have not applied for refugee status within six 
months of their arrival or who have not come directly from a terri-
tory where their life, physical integrity or security of person is 
threatened for the reasons enumerated in Article 1A(2). If not granted 
temporary residence permit, applicants may not be eligible for long-
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term residency even after they are recognized as refugees. Although 
applicants who failed to meet the criteria for temporary residence 
would not be deported, they may likely be detained despite being 
asylum seekers. Furthermore, it is totally up to the discretion of the 
Justice Minister whether those who have not been granted temporary 
residency would be permitted to stay in Japan after they are recog-
nized as refugees. 
 As of writing this paper, the bill is still pending before the Diet. In 
the meantime, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations and other 
organizations working for the protection of refugees expressed con-
cern, while appreciating the abolition of the 60-day rule, that the bill 
would bring in new problems rather than solutions to refugee prob-
lems. Particularly criticized is the introduction of the "six- month 
rule", which might simply contribute to producing yet another time 
limit problem. The requirement of "coming directly" is another 
source of concern. From a perspective of international human rights 
law, one fundamental question is whether the distinctions made 
between asylum seekers and between recognized refugees regarding 
residency status are tantamount to discrimination prohibited by such 
documents as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. In any event, it is unfortunate that the bill was prepared 
predominantly by the Ministry of Justice, a state organ responsible 
for controlling immigration. The scope of refugee issues is much 
wider than the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. Can we hope 
that the bill signals the beginning of a series of discussion that would 
lead up to the betterment of refugee policies of our country? 
 As a final note, let me get back to the global perspective. Parallel 
to the construction of restrictive containment policies, there has been 
an increase in cases regarding refugees and asylum seekers brought
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to international human rights mechanisms. European lawyers are apt 
at using the European Court of Human Rights to protect refugees. 
One of the most encouraging judgments of the Court is the one which 
dealt with the legal status of an international zone which France 
established apparently to avoid international obligations, a measure 
reminiscent of the Australian excised territories. The Court, flatly 
denying the extraterritorial character of the international zone, 
held54 : 
   Contracting States have the undeniable sovereign right to control 
   aliens' entry into and residence in their territory. The Court 
   emphasizes, however, that this right must be exercised in accor-
   dance with the provisions of the [European] Convention, includ-
   ing Article 5...Holding Aliens in the international zone does 
   indeed involve a restriction upon liberty, but one which is not in 
   every respect comparable to that which obtains in centres for the 
   detention of aliens pending deportation. Such confinement,ac-
   companied by suitable safeguards for the persons concerned, is 
   acceptable only in order to enable States to prevent unlawful 
   immigration while complying with their international obliga-
   tions, particularly under the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to 
   the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human 
   Rights. States' legitimate concern to foil the increasingly fre-
   quent attempts to circumvent immigration restrictions mustnot 
   deprive asylum seekers of the protection afforded by these 
    conventions.
 In a case in which the legality of a measure of expulsion was 
challenged, the Court stated" :
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[I] t is well established in the case-law of the Court that expulsion 
by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, 
and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the 
Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a 
real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in 
the receiving country. In these circumstances, Article 3 implies 
the obligation not to expel the person in question to that country.
 The Committee against Torture, since 1994 when it received its 
first case, has issued on several occasions its views prohibiting the 
expulsion of a person to a state where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected 
torture. More important, the Committee addressed issues relevant to 
assessment of testimony of asylum seekers, often victims of torture. 
The problem is how you assess the credibility of the story told by 
asylum seekers when contradictions and inconsistencies occur. The 
Committee in employing the most advanced psychological knowledge 
stated that "complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims 
of torture and that such inconsistencies hould not raise doubts about 
the veracity of the application for asylum"56. 
 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for their part 
expressed concerns about issues relevant to refugees, such as carrier 
sanctions, housing , education and social services. It seems that 
restrictive asylum policies of the North have helped anchor refugee 
issues as an integral part of international human rights law, an 
encouraging phenomenon for refugee advocates who are forced to 
witness the shrinking scope of the Refugee Convention. Surely
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recourse should be had to international human rights law whose 
protection is extended to every human being, refugees and asylum 
seekers being no exception. It is highly likely that international 
human rights arguments will permeate Japanese legal practice in 
respect of refugee protection. But I am not sure whether the recourse 
to human rights law, no matter how effective it may be, will substan-
tively reshape the directions of restrictive asylum policies heavily 
propounded by ruling elites to exclude and contain refugees. 
 Fundamentally speaking, what should be addressed is the contem-
porary international structure which serves as a direct cause of 
refugee production. It is recalled that virtually all refugees come 
from the South/East. Very few if any asylum seekers flee from the 
North/West. Yet, of those granted asylum, seven out of ten are 
hosted by the South. Unless the issue of the shamefully disproportion-
ate international political and economic structures is addressed 
upright, we will never be liberated from human tragedies arising 
from refugee exodus. Demir argues : "As life expectancy is dropping 
in the global south and rising in the global north, and the wealth of 
the richest 200 people in the world is ten times that of the combined 
wealth of the 582,000,000 poorest, a transfer of funds from the rich 
global north to the poor global south is desperately needed. However, 
as documented by the UNDP, there has been a massive shift away 
from a global-north to global-south allocation of development 
resources. While these global inequities exist, it is unlikely that we 
will see any great reduction of migration."57 
 One should not forget that Northern/Western international law-
yers have been always behind these structural iniquities. For those 
committed to third world perspectives, international law is the illegit-
imate, predatory and oppressive regime of the unjust global order and
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so is to be resisted58. International law underpins Western political 
and economic hegemony and enshrines as global gospel the values of 
Western liberal civilization. True, there once was a passionate quest 
for a post-hegemonic order during the period of decolonization. Some 
of the achievements included : elevation of the principle of self-
determination to an established norm of international law, reorgani-
zation of the law of expropriation based on permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, the substantiation of the concept of common 
heritage of mankind, reshaping of international economic order under 
the banner of the New International Economic Order. The search for 
a new order was initiated with a view to achieving the full democrati-
zation of the international structures so that all voices can be heard. 
Unfortunately, however, traces of the third world voices cannot be 
easily located today in international law59. 
 The post-cold war period has seen a triumph of the West. A 
neo-liberal model developed and utilized by the West now dominates 
the entire fields of international discourse. Antony Anghie eloquently 
asserts that "the essential structure of the civilizing mission may be 
reconstructed in the contemporary vocabulary of human rights, 
governance, and economic liberalization."60 Western liberal thinking 
about international legal order increasingly bears resemblances to 
the 19th century standards of imperialism which dictates the division 
of the world into a hierarchy of civilized nations, barbarous human-
ity, and savage humanity". As long as the colonial and imperial past 
of the international system remains embedded in the contemporary 
rules and institutions of international law, the structural iniquities 
last and the outflow of refugees continues. 
 For international lawyers working for the protection of refugees, 
particularly those based in the culpable North, a fundamental chal-
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lenge is to chart a new direction for revamping and democratizing the 
unjust structure of international legal order. No doubt this is an 
exceptionally formidable intellectual challenge, but it is an indispens-
able challenge for unraveling and hopefully eradicating the genuine 
"root causes" of perpetuated global refugee problems.
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